Iran’s Tehran Flight Information Region remains only partially open amid persistent regional tensions, with the western sector closed since early June 2026 while limited eastern overflights continue under strict altitude and routing constraints. The breakdown of the April 2026 US-Iran ceasefire extension, followed by renewed US strikes near the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian responses, prompted EASA to extend its Conflict Zone Information Bulletin advising operators to avoid Iranian airspace entirely through at least August 31, 2026. Multiple governments maintain similar NOTAMs citing risks of misidentification, surface-to-air threats, and GPS interference. International carriers largely reroute via longer northern or southern corridors, sustaining elevated operational costs. Any further escalation in US-Iran or Israel-Iran military activity, or conversely verifiable de-escalation and full reopening of all sectors, would directly shape trader assessments of near-term full closure likelihood.
Experimental AI-generated summary referencing Polymarket data. This is not trading advice and plays no role in how this market resolves. · UpdatedIran full airspace closure by...?
$8,666,186 Vol.
August 31
2%
September 30
6%
December 31
18%
$8,666,186 Vol.
August 31
2%
September 30
6%
December 31
18%
A “general closure” refers to a cancellation or suspension of aviation which is generally applicable to all commercial flights transiting Iranian airspace (“Tehran FIR”). A qualifying closure must apply generally to all of Iran or the Tehran FIR; limited cancellations, delays, or partial closures will not qualify. A closure which applies generally to commercial aviation across Iranian airspace, with limited exceptions for certain categories of flights, however, will qualify (e.g. exceptions for certain flights pre-approved by the Iranian Civil Aviation Authority may be permitted).
Qualifying previous examples include the February 28, 2026 total closure of Iranian airspace (https://www.iranintl.com/en/202602289115) and the January 2026 total closure of Iranian airspace except to international flights with express governmental permission (https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-shuts-airspace-most-flights-flightradar24-says-2026-01-14/). Non-qualifying examples include the January 27, 2026 partial closure of Iranian airspace around the Strait of Hormuz (https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iran-issues-airspace-notice-for-military-drills-near-strait-of-hormuz/3812508), the April 2024 closure of Iran’s western airspace (https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iranian-airports-cancel-flights-until-monday-morning-2024-04-14/), and the January 25 - April 25, 2026 VFR (Visual Flight Rules) flights suspension which did not broadly close commercial aviation in Iran (https://www.intellinews.com/iran-suspends-general-aviation-and-vfr-flights-in-new-airspace-directive-421997/).
Warnings, No-Fly-Zones, or other flight restrictions imposed by airlines or countries other than Iran will not be sufficient for a “Yes” resolution.
Airspace closures which occur solely due to weather conditions, earthquakes, or volcanic eruptions, will not qualify.
The primary resolution sources for this market will be official information from Iranian aviation authorities and a consensus of credible reporting.
Market Opened: Jun 25, 2026, 7:21 PM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...A “general closure” refers to a cancellation or suspension of aviation which is generally applicable to all commercial flights transiting Iranian airspace (“Tehran FIR”). A qualifying closure must apply generally to all of Iran or the Tehran FIR; limited cancellations, delays, or partial closures will not qualify. A closure which applies generally to commercial aviation across Iranian airspace, with limited exceptions for certain categories of flights, however, will qualify (e.g. exceptions for certain flights pre-approved by the Iranian Civil Aviation Authority may be permitted).
Qualifying previous examples include the February 28, 2026 total closure of Iranian airspace (https://www.iranintl.com/en/202602289115) and the January 2026 total closure of Iranian airspace except to international flights with express governmental permission (https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-shuts-airspace-most-flights-flightradar24-says-2026-01-14/). Non-qualifying examples include the January 27, 2026 partial closure of Iranian airspace around the Strait of Hormuz (https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iran-issues-airspace-notice-for-military-drills-near-strait-of-hormuz/3812508), the April 2024 closure of Iran’s western airspace (https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iranian-airports-cancel-flights-until-monday-morning-2024-04-14/), and the January 25 - April 25, 2026 VFR (Visual Flight Rules) flights suspension which did not broadly close commercial aviation in Iran (https://www.intellinews.com/iran-suspends-general-aviation-and-vfr-flights-in-new-airspace-directive-421997/).
Warnings, No-Fly-Zones, or other flight restrictions imposed by airlines or countries other than Iran will not be sufficient for a “Yes” resolution.
Airspace closures which occur solely due to weather conditions, earthquakes, or volcanic eruptions, will not qualify.
The primary resolution sources for this market will be official information from Iranian aviation authorities and a consensus of credible reporting.
Resolver
0x65070BE91...Iran’s Tehran Flight Information Region remains only partially open amid persistent regional tensions, with the western sector closed since early June 2026 while limited eastern overflights continue under strict altitude and routing constraints. The breakdown of the April 2026 US-Iran ceasefire extension, followed by renewed US strikes near the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian responses, prompted EASA to extend its Conflict Zone Information Bulletin advising operators to avoid Iranian airspace entirely through at least August 31, 2026. Multiple governments maintain similar NOTAMs citing risks of misidentification, surface-to-air threats, and GPS interference. International carriers largely reroute via longer northern or southern corridors, sustaining elevated operational costs. Any further escalation in US-Iran or Israel-Iran military activity, or conversely verifiable de-escalation and full reopening of all sectors, would directly shape trader assessments of near-term full closure likelihood.
Experimental AI-generated summary referencing Polymarket data. This is not trading advice and plays no role in how this market resolves. · Updated



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